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Interest Rate Ceilings and Income Distribution 
Interest-rate ceilings on agricultural loans tend to have a 
regressive distributive impact on farmers. To become beneficia-
ries of subsidized credit, producers must first become borrowers 
from an institutional lender. Access to formal credit, however, 
is usually restricted. A large proportion of the rural producers 
of the developing countries are excluded from institutional port-
folios and, therefore, from the subsidy. Moreover, the amount of 
the free transfer of claims on resources is directly proportional 
to the size of the loan which, in turn, is correlated with wealth 
and influence. Large farmers receive large loans and large sub-
sidies, medium-size farmers get small loans and only small subsi-
dies, and small farmers do not get formal credit at all. Similar-
ly, when a large borrower defaults on a loan, a greater wealth 
transfer takes place. Moreover, given interest-rate ceilings, 
lenders tend to redistribute loan portfolios in favor of non-
rationed borrowers, usually the largest and the safest. Small 
farmers, therefore, not only receive a smaller subsidy, but they 
are also rationed and excluded from loan portfolios more rapidly. 
In addition, they receive a meager return on their deposits (2). 
In the case of Costa Rica, the nationalized banking system 
has been able to reach a comparatively large proportion of the 
country's farmers with loans (about one-third). Credit portfo-
l 
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lios, however, have been concentrated. About 10 percent of the 
number of borrowers have received about 85 percent of the total 
amounts of credit disbursed and, thereby, 85 percent of the im-
plicit subsidy. Agricultural credit has been more concentrated 
than land ownership or than income. Depending on the annual rate 
of inflation, the implicit subsidy has represented up to 25 per-
cent of value added in agriculture (3,4). 
For farmers, access to credit may be critical for invest-
ment, additional working capital, risk management, and income 
growth. Unfortunately, the policies that have attempted to keep 
the price of credit artificially low have, at the same time, re-
duced access to formal loans for the intended beneficiaries. 
credit programs are more attractive if the funds are granted at a 
low total cost to the borrower, if funds are disbursed when they 
are needed, and if their amount is sufficient to satisfy a farm-
er's demand. Policies designed to make credit cheap, on the other 
hand, have focused on contractual interest rates only, neglecting 
non-interest costs of borrowing. Those policies have ignored the 
interdependence between interest-rate structures and non-interest 
costs of borrowing, as well as the interaction between the price 
of loans, their opportunity, and their sufficiency. This paper 
presents an estimation of the level and dispersion of non-inter-
est costs of borrowing for Costa Rican farmers and illustrates 
the relationships between the explicit and implicit cost of cred-
it, access to loans, and other terms and conditions of the loan 
contracts. It concludes that transactions costs resulting from 
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rate ceilings have a regressive impact on distribution, too. 
Costs of Borrowing 
What matters for the borrower's investment and production 
decisions is the total cost of the funds. The non-interest costs 
of the funds include explicit expenses, such as bank commissions 
and fees, taxes, lawyer and document costs, the borrower's trans-
portation, lodging, and food during trips to the bank, bribes, 
and the forced purchase of other services, as well as implicit 
costs, such as the value of the time spent in completing loan 
transactions, going to the bank, and fulfilling requirements. Re-
quests of a compensatory deposit increase loan costs. Lack of 
timeliness and insufficient loan amounts are also costly. Delays 
in disbursement result in lower yields, while too small loans 
make complementary funds from other sources indispensable, with 
additional transactions costs for the producer. 
I 
Any loan has four dimensions: size (amount) , the explicit 
interest charged, the non-interest costs of borrowing, and the 
other terms and conditions of the loan contract. Borrowers value 
long terms, flexibility, limited collateral requirements, and the 
permanency and predictability of the services that results from 
an established bank-customer relationship. The borrower's demand 
is a function of these characteristics, while lenders adjust them 
for different classes of borrowers. When binding ceilings are im-
posed on interest rates, lenders adjust either the non-interest 
charges and the other terms and conditions of the loan contracts 
or reduce the loan amounts, depending on demand and supply elas-
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tici ties and regulatory constraints. Borrowers receive a less 
attractive combination of the four loan dimensions, while the 
lender's willingness to lend to marginal clientele declines. The 
elimination of the ceilings would be, therefore, Pareto optimum. 
All mechanisms to clear the market in the presence of inter-
est-rate restrictions increase the non-interest costs of borrow-
ing. If loan amounts decline (quantity rationing), average bor-
rowing costs increase, given their independence of loan size. If 
new fees and com.missions, more strict requirements, or more com-
plex procedures are used (implicit prices), transactions costs 
augment. Less attractive terms and conditions imply also greater 
costs per unit of credit. Given these interdependencies, at-
tempts to keep interest rates below equilibrium levels do not ne-
cessarily make credit cheap. 
Borrowing Costs in Costa Rica 
Measurement of the level and components of non-interest bor-
rowing costs for Costa Rican farmers was based on a survey of 394 
clients of the Banco Nacional who borrowed, during 1983, from one 
of ten selected branches. This bank granted 60 percent of all 
agricultural credit in Costa Rica, through a network of 80 rural 
branches. Many producers do not demand loans because the tran-
sactions costs are too high. The major consequence of these 
costs1 the exclusion of potential borrowers from market partici-
pation could not be observed, therefore, by this survey of bor-
rowers. Similarly, long distance and limited access, due to the 
absence of roads or their poor CE>ndition, prevented the comple-
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tion of some interviews in the sample. These clients do incur in 
high transactions costs, precisely for the same reasons. As a 
consequence, there was an underestimation of borrowing costs. A 
detailed questionnaire measured commissions and fees, taxes, 
legal and document costs, travel expenses (weighted in the case 
of multipurpose trips), and obtained data to impute the oppor-
tunity cost of the time of the borrower and of those acting on 
his behalf (by using the minimum wage in agriculture, which also 
underestimates true time costs). 
The average level of non-interest costs of borrowing was 
high. It amounted to 6. 8 percent of loan size and, when loan 
term was considered, it was equivalent to 11.5 percent per year. 
Since average interest rates were 13.6 percent, the total cost of 
the funds was at least 25 percent per year. This high level was 
surprising, given the small size of the country, the extension of 
the network of roads and bank branches, and the nationalization 
of the banks (to promote service rather than profits). The bor-
rowers were literate (87 percent) and had a long banking exper-
ience (on the average had borrowed from this bank for 9.1 years). 
On the average, interest payments represented 54 percent of 
the total costs of the funds. In the case of smaller borrowers 
(less than US$ 200), interest accounted for only 25 percent of 
total borrowing costs, while for larger borrowers (US$ 10,000 and 
over) they accounted for 86 percent. The authorities had little 
knowledge about the magnitude of these non-interest costs of bor-
rowing. Given their relative importance, moreover, the regula-
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tory emphasis on contractual interest rates has been misplaced. 
Notable was the dispersion of non-interest borrowing costs. 
While interest rates ranged between 8 and 3 o percent per year, 
non-interest costs ranged between 0.2 and 117.5 percent per year. 
The total cost of the funds ranged between 10.8 and 129.5 percent 
per year (while the annual rate of inflation was 26 percent). 
There was a four-fold difference (22 points) among the interest 
rates and a 600-fold difference (117 points) among the non-inter-
est costs of borrowing. While ignored, therefore, the impact of 
the non-interest components of the costs of borrowing on wealth 
and income distribution is the most important. 
Determinants of these non-interest borrowing costs were 
estimated with a generalized translogarithmic borrowing-cost 
function, through ordinary least squares, as follows: 
ln C = 10.7 - 1.28 lnL - 0.11 Al lnL + 0.05 i lnL - 2.84 lni 
+ 0.09 lnT + 0.22 lnK + 0.32 ln AN - 0.30 A2 - 0.44 A3 
+ 0.39 CRl + 0.40 U - 0.34 E2 - 0.45 Pl - 0.667 P2 
where C: non-interest borrowing costs per col6n, L: loan size, 
i: interest rate, T: cultivated area, K: distance to the 
bank's branch, AN: branch age, Al: dummy for loan use in 
basic grains, A2 : dummy for loan use in export crops, A3: 
dummy for loan use in livestock, CRl: dummy for collateral 
type, U: dummy for individual versus corporate borrowers, 
E2: dummy for the borrower's education level, Pl and P2: 
dummies for loan term. 
These were the results of an estimation corrected for multicolli-
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nearity and heteroskedasticity. All coefficients were signific-
ant with a two-tailed t-test at the 0.01 level and R-square was 
0.62. They indicated that loan size, the interest rate charged, 
and distance from the borrower's home to the bank's branch were 
significant determinants of borrowing costs. Size of exploita-
tion and the age of the branch were also significant, but not 
with the expected sign. This reflected a lack of correlation be-
tween land area and loan size, given different values of the ex-
ploitations per unit of land. The end use of the funds, the type 
of credit program, the kind of collateral used, the loan's term, 
and the borrower's level of education also explained differences 
in borrowing costs. 
On the average, the borrowers interviewed received US$ 2,400 
loans, ranging in size between US$ 60 and 32,000. Loans between 
US$ 200 and 1,000 represented 47 percent of the sample. Non-in-
terest borrowing costs per colon declined rapidly with loan size, 
from 37 percent per year for loans of less than US$ 200, to 2.8 
percent for loans above US$ 1,000. The elasticity of these non-
interest costs of borrowing with respect to loan size (E) was 
given by: 
E = - 1.279 - 0.011 Al + 0.095 i 
Thus, for a median interest rate of 12 percent, this elasticity 
would be - 0.68 for basic grain loans and - 0.79 for export-crop 
loans. 
This marked inverse relationship between borrowing costs and 
loan size highlights the regressive impact of these costs on dis-
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tribution. In the case of smaller loans {below US$ 200) , non-in-
terest borrowing costs, which amounted to 37.1 percent per year, 
represented three-fourths of the total cost of the funds ( 49. 3 
percent per year). In the case of large loans (above US$ 1,000), 
non-interest borrowing costs, which amounted to 2.8 percent per 
year, represented only 15 percent of the total cost of the funds 
(18.4 percent per year). In view of this inverse relationship, a 
generalized increased in borrowing costs would lead to a non-
uniform contraction in the demand for loans, with the smaller 
borrowers deciding that the new total cost of the funds is too 
high for them, while the impact on the larger borrowers will be 
hardly noticed. For example, a new procedure with an extra cost 
of US$ 20, will add 10 percentage points to the cost of the funds 
in the case of a US$ 200 borrower, but only 2 percentage points 
in the case of a US$ 1,000 borrower. Given the limited access to 
formal credit of small farmers in developing countries, their ex-
clusion from institutional loan portfolios because of too high 
transactions costs has a regressive distributive impact. 
The results also showed a significant inverse relationship 
between non-interest costs and interest rates. The elasticity of 
these costs with respect to the rate of interest charged (F) was: 
F = - 2.842 + 0.045 i lnL 
For the median loan size of US$ 860 and median interest rate of 
12 percent, this elasticity is -0.811. For smaller loans, the 
elasticity is higher. It becomes unitary for US$ 600 loans. That 
is, a given proportional interest-rate reduction would be accom-
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panied by an increase in non-interest costs of borrowing in the 
same proportion. Since interest payments are a less important 
part of the total cost of the funds, this implies a net increase 
in such costs. For US$ 200 loans, this elasticity is - 1.806. 
This implies that for these borrowers, a reduction of interest 
rates of one percentage point will be accompanied by an increase 
in non-interest costs of borrowing of 5.5 points and an increase 
in the total cost of the funds of 4.5 points. 
This confirms the existence of the trade-off between the in-
terest and non-interest costs of borrowing. Underequilibrium in-
terest rates generate excess demands for ere di t that require 
strict rationing criteria (more complex procedures, additional 
steps, and waiting) and thereby increase borrowing costs. A more 
strict end-use targeting for the funds, supervision, or eligi-
bility requirements also increase borrowing costs. Also, 
preferential interest rates make it difficult for the lenders to 
cover operating costs and risks of default. The tend to shift, 
therefore, some of these costs over to the borrowers or try to 
discourage marginal clients from applying for the subsidized 
loans. Borrowing costs were higher in the case of small, basic-
grain producers than for export-oriented farmers, and when the 
collateral was a cosigner rather than a mortgage. 
In these circumstances, raising interest rates may have a 
positive effect on income distribution. The interest payments 
component will weight more in the case of larger borrowers, dis-
couraging them from demanding subsidized loans, given their ac-
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cess to alternative sources of credit, while in the case of the 
smaller borrowers, the impact will be proportionately less and 
would probably be more than compensated for by the expected de-
cline in non-interest borrowing costs and their increased access 
to formal loans. The funds released, in view of less demand from 
larger borrowers, would become available to satisfy the larger 
demand of the smaller borrowers, while the intermediary would be 
in a position to offer more attractive rates to depositors. 
The positive elasticity of borrowing costs with respect to 
distance suggests the potential social gains from a further geo-
graphical expansion of the branch network and from a reduction of 
the required number of trips to the branch (less requirements, 
disbursement in one installment). The 394 borrowers interviewed 
made 3,675 trips to the branches, with a total duration of 14,700 
working hours. This represented an average of 4.5 full working 
days for the client, usually at the time of planting. The aver-
age number of trips was 9.3 per borrower, and it ranged between 1 
and 19 trips per loan. The inverse relationship of borrowing 
costs and loan term indicates the desirability of granting lines 
of credit to farmers, rather than individualized loans. Borrow-
ing costs were higher with those with previous delinquency re-
cords and lower for those who were also depositors in the bank. 
Conclusions 
The most important indicator Qf the efficient performance of 
the financial system are the level and dispersion of the transac-
tions costs imposed on actual and potential market participants. 
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High transactions costs imply that society is spending too many 
resources in operating the financial system and that, as a re-
sult, the costs of the funds for the borrowers are too high, the 
net rewards for depositors are too low, the profitability of fi-
nancial intermediaries is unattractive, and the size of financial 
markets is too small. A large dispersion of transactions costs 
results in wide divergences among marginal rates of return ac-
cross the economy and in unexploited opportunities for growth and 
improved resource allocation. Non-interest borrowing costs, in 
particular, have a significant impact on differential access to 
loans and, therefore, on income and wealth distribution. 
Emphasis on contractual interest rate levels, just another 
component of the total costs of borrowing, ignores the importance 
of non-interest costs. While interest rates may be set by de-
cree, however, non-interest transactions costs cannot always be 
so reduced. When they reflect excessive regulation, unnecessary 
bureaucratic requirements, or unwarranted donor targeting, they 
may be reduced if the undesirable restrictions are eliminated. 
When they reflect plain X-inefficiency, they may be reduced by 
organizational and managerial reforms. When they arise from re-
gulatory avoidance and rationing schemes, in the presence of in-
terest-rate and other financial restrictions, such as reserve 
requirements, rediscounting programs, or selective credit con-
trols, the underlying policies can be corrected. In the end, 
however, they essentially reflect the high costs of information 
and the risks characteristic of developing countries, represented 
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by the human and non-human inputs required for the joint produc-
tion of loans by borrowers and lenders. Ultimately, they will be 
reduced by innovations in financial technology, further market 
integration and enlargement, economies of scale and economies of 
scope, and greater competition. Emphasis on interest-rate res-
trictions, on the other hand, is misplaced. The components of 
the total costs of the funds are not independent. Interest-rate 
ceilings increase transactions costs, create delays, and reduce 
loan size. As a consequence, loans are not necessarily cheap~ 
timely, and sufficient. The distributional incidence of these 
other factors is highly regressive. 
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